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1.

INTRODUCTION'

The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man 2 (hereinafter: American
Declaration) and the American Convention on Human Rights 3 (hereinafter: American
Convention), are the two most important instruments of the Inter-American system
for the protection and promotion of human rights. Supervision of compliance is
carried out by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights4 (hereinafter: the
Commission) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights5 (hereinafter: the
Court). The Commission fulfills its functions primarily through country reports
analyzing the overall human rights situation in a country and through decisions on
individual petitions presented by individuals who complain that their internationallyprotected rights have been violated. Individuals have standing to file petitions only
with the Commission, and not the Court. Only the former body (or the affected state)
may decide to bring cases to the Court, where the State has accepted the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction, and if the State fails to comply within three months with the
Commission's recommendations in the underlying case. 6 The main function of the
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Dean, American University Washington College of Law, and former member and President of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
This piece draws extensively from the author's article on "The Inter-American System of Human
Rights: Challenges for the Future", as published in 84 Indiana Law Journal (2008-4).
Organization of American States Official Res., Adopted by the Ninth International Conference of
American States, OEA/ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev. 6 (1948), <http://cidh.org/Basicos/English/
Basic2.American%20Declaration.htm>.
22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 143 (hereinafter: American Convention).
IACommHR, Annual Report 1998, OEA/ser.L./V./II.102, doc. 6 rev., ch. I, <www.cidh. oas.org/
annualrep/98eng/Table%20of%20Contents.htm>.
The Secretary General, Annual Report of the Secretary General 1999-2000, ch. III, <www.cidi.oas.
org/annualreportO0-e/annualreport99-00-3.htm>.
For a description of the Inter-American system, see C. Grossman, "The Veldsquez Rodriguez Case:
The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System", in J.E. Noyes, L.A. Dickinson and
M.W. Janis (eds), InternationalLaw Stories (New York, Foundation Press 2007), p. 81-84. The
petition system has not always been the favored or the most efficient means to address human rights
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Court is to issue decisions on the petitions before it. In addition, the Court has the
ability to render Advisory Opinions interpreting human rights treaties applicable in
the Western Hemisphere. The political organs of the Organization of American States
(hereinafter: OAS), i.e. the Permanent Council and the General Assembly, are
responsible for guaranteeing compliance with the American Declaration and
Convention, as well as with the decisions of the Commission and the Court.7
The stages of development of the Inter-American system can be categorized into
three main phases which nevertheless intersect and overlap. The first phase spans
from the inception of the Inter-American court until roughly the 1980s, when the
system dealt with dictatorial regimes characterized by mass and gross violations of
human rights. The first three decisions of the Inter-American Court's contested cases
all dealing with forced disappearances in Honduras characterize the way in which
these violations were confronted.8 During the second phase, the Americas experienced
a generalized rise of democracy that required rejection of the legacies of dictatorial
regimes. The Commission and the Court were confronted with issues such as impunity,
freedom of expression, and due process. During this phase the supervisory organs
further developed the scope of States' obligations under Articles 1(1) and (2) of the
American Convention, especially concerning the duties to investigate and punish
those allegedly responsible for human rights violations, and the need to conform
States' domestic legislation to the objectives laid down by the American Convention.
On 11 September 2001, in Lima, Peru, the OAS General Assembly at the XXVIII
Special Session, recognized the hemisphere's new political reality and adopted the
Inter-American Democratic Charter. The Charter explicitly establishes democracy as
a right, of which respect for fundamental human rights is an indispensable element
and allows the organization to adopt sanctions against delinquent states.
Currently, the system is in its third phase, where issues of inequality and exclusion,
such as poverty, threaten to undermine the expansion ofdemocratic values experienced
during the second phase. The Western Hemisphere currently has the least equitable
distribution of wealth in the world. Vulnerable groups, such as indigenous people,
women, minorities, and children, do not fully enjoy human rights.

7
8

50

violations in the hemisphere. The Commission had resorted to country reports, some following
visits in loco to the OAS member states, geared towards mobilizing public opinion, particularly in
cases of massive and systematic violations. With the evolution of the political situation of the
hemisphere and a dramatic decrease in violations of political rights, the petition system (cases)
became the main vehicle for addressing human rights violations. States in the process of democratic
transition generally participated in the proceedings. The petition system was adopted as the
predominant means to enhance the protection of human rights and develop uniform and cohesive
standards, while decreasing reliance on, but not entirely abandoning, the other mechanisms already
in place.
Charter of the Organization of American States, 30 April 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 19 UNTS 3.
IACtHR (Judgment), 15 March 1989, Fairen Garbi and Solis Corrales v. Honduras; IACtHR
(Judgment), 20 January 1989, Godinez Cruz v. Honduras; IACtHR (Judgment), 29 July 1988,
Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras.
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As these phases have developed, the Commission and Court's case law has been
significant in advancing the protection of fundamental rights. This article describes
and analyzes three cases that illustrate the development ofthe Inter-American system's
phases, describes how that system has confronted gross and systematic human rights
violations, and evaluates the future of the Inter-American system, making proposals
for its further development. The included cases are: Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras
(1988), which concerns mass and gross violations of human rights involving forced
disappearances in the context of authoritarianism and dictatorships; BarriosAltos v.
Peru (2001),9 which addresses the legacy of dictatorships, particularly with regard to
impunity; and Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua(2001),10 which
examines the rights of indigenous peoples, the status of vulnerable groups and the
need to expand and strengthen democracy through the inclusion of such groups.

2.

THE CASE OF ANGEL MANFREDO VELASQUEZ
RODRIGUEZ

The case of Angel Manfredo Velasquez addresses a forced disappearance, in which the
state both denied involvement and refused to investigate or try the case. Disappearances
are particularly egregious violations of human rights because they are perpetrated by
State authorities who later deny any knowledge or involvement. In the 1970s and 1980s
in Latin America, disappearances were a grim political and legal reality for many
including Manfredo Velisquez and his family.
Angel Manfredo Veldsquez Rodriguez disappeared on September 12, 1981, in
downtown Tegucigalpa, Honduras. His friends and family never saw him again. The
Honduran government denied any knowledge or involvement in his disappearance,
and the Honduran courts refused to hear the family's case.11
The petition in Veldsquez Rodriguez was filed with the Commission in October
1981,12 and alleged that the Honduran government was responsible for Manfredo
Velisquez's disappearance.13 As was common in disappearance cases, the government
of Honduras failed to provide the Commission with evidence and information about

9
1o
"
12

13

IACtHR (Judgment), 14 March 2001, BarriosAltos v. Peru.
IACtHR (Judgment), 31 August 2001, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua.
For a more extensive analysis of the case, see Grossman, supra n. 6.
See IACommHR (Report) 18 April 1986, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,Case No. 7920, Report
No. 22/86, OEA/Ser.L./III.15, doc. 13 (reporting that the Commission received the petition on
7 October 1981, and stating that the petition maintained that Manfredo Velasquez was in the First
Battalion of Infantry in Tegucigalpa along with other missing political prisoners).
Ibid., para. I (reporting that the petition stated that "{wle assign responsibility for that action to
Colonels Leonidas Torres Arias (G-2), Gustavo Alvarez (FUSEP), Juan Lopez Grijalba (National
Investigation Department) and Hubbert Bodden (Commander, First Battalion of Infantry,
Tegucigalpa)").
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the disappearance, 14 and as a result, the Commission was forced to presume the
validity of the facts as alleged by the petitioner,15 as was required at that time by
Article 42 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. 16 The Commission's report
indicated that Manfredo Velisquez had been detained and most likely disappeared
because of state agents in Honduras. 7 For the first time in a disappearance case, the
Court held that the crime of disappearance violated specific articles of the American
Convention, particularly the right to life (Article 4) and the right to personal liberty
(Article 7). The Commission recommended investigation and punishment of those
guilty as well as reparations.
In 1985, after General Alvarez, the military strongman of Honduras, was ousted
from power, the new government of Honduras requested additional time to conduct
an internal investigation.18 However, the investigation concluded with a four-sentence
report stating that there was no evidence connecting anyone in the military to the
disappearance.19 Consequently, in April 1986, the Commission affirmed its earlier
recommendation in its entirety and referred the case to Court. 20
2.1.

THE DECISION

While the American Convention does not explicitly "criminalize" disappearances,
the Court ruled that the practice of forced disappearances does constitute multiple
and continuous violations of the rights protected in four articles of the Convention, 21
specifically Articles 1 (duty to guarantee the included rights without discrimination),
4 (right to life), 5 (right to personal integrity), and 7 (right to personal liberty). "The

21

Ibid., paras. 4-6 (indicating that the Commission did not receive the requested information from
the Honduran government despite requests sent on 14 October 1981, 24 November 1981, 6 October
1982, 23 March 1983 and 9 August 1983).
Ibid., Article 39.
See IACommHR, 2001 Rules of Procedure (hereinafter: Commission's Rules of Procedure)
(approved by the Commission in 2000, and amended in 2002 and 2003) ("The facts alleged in the
petition, the pertinent parts of which have been transmitted to the State in question, shall be
presumed to be true if the State has not provided responsive information during the maximum
period set by the Commission under the provisions of Article 38 of these Rules of Procedure, as long
as other evidence does not lead to a different conclusion").
See IACommHR (Report) 18 April 1986, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,Case No. 7920, Report
No. 22/86, OEA/Ser.L/V/I1.61, doc. 44.
Ibid., para. 16 (relating that Honduras requested postponement of consideration of the case in its
Cablegram of 1 March 1985 and that it stated that it had set up an Investigating Commission to
examine the complaints and identify and punish those responsible).
See C. Grossman, "Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim Representation in
Human Rights Litigation", 15 Hastings Internationaland Comparative Law Review (1991-1992),
p. 363, 368-69.
See Article 50 Regulations IACommHR, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev. para. 1 (1992); Article 63(1)
American Convention, supra n. 3.
IACtHR (Judgment), 29 July 1988, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras.
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kidnapping of a person is an arbitrary deprivation of liberty, an infringement of a
detainee's right to be taken without delay before a judge and to invoke the appropriate
procedures to review the legality of the arrest, all in violation of Article 7 of the
Convention which recognizes the right to personal liberty."22 The Court interpreted
Article 5's provisions regarding cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as prohibiting
incommunicado detention. 23 It also found that prolonged and isolated imprisonment
harms the "psychological and moral integrity of the person."24 Finally, the Court
acknowledged that disappearances involving clandestine executions without trials
and clandestine burials violated the right to life under Article 4.25 The Court agreed
that disappearances represented violations beyond that of the express articles of the
Convention, by characterizing disappearances as a violation of the human rights
implicitly protected by the values of the system. It stated that "[t]he practice of
disappearances [...I shows a crass abandonment of the values which emanate from the
concept of human dignity and of the most basic principals of the Inter-American
system and the Convention." 26
The Veldsquez Rodriguez decision was the first case decided by an international
tribunal to declare the practice of forced disappearances illegal. By exposing the State's
responsibility for this practice and rejecting a status quo characterized by repression
and authoritarianism, the case helped further the goals ofhuman rights and democracy
in the region. The case challenged the pervasive culture of impunity and deniability in
countries in the region and required State governments to respond to such allegations
beyond mere denials of involvement. In the context of other domestic and international
factors present during this early phase, such as the end of the Cold War and the easing
of tensions in the region, the Veldsquez Rodriguez decision contributed to the end of
the systemic state practice of disappearances, and enhanced human rights protections
in the hemisphere.
2.2.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VELASQUEZ RODRIGUEZ CASE
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND COURT

The Veldsquez Rodriguez decision was unique in that it explicitly defined
disappearances, establishing clearly that this horrendous crime violated the American
Convention, while exposing the criminal behavioral of dictatorial regimes. 27 Prior to
this decision, the issue was addressed by the United Nations General Assembly which
22
23

24
2s
26
27

Ibid., para. 155.
Ibid., para. 156 (stating that "prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication are in
themselves cruel and inhumane treatment, harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the
person").
Ibid.; Article 5 American Convention, supra n. 3.
IACtHR (Judgment), 29 July 1988, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,para. 157.
Ibid., para. 158.
Ibid., paras. 151-153.
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adopted resolutions condemning forced disappearances, and the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights created the Working Group on Enforced and
Involuntary Disappearances which assisted families in determining the fate of their
relatives and establishing channels of communication between the families and the
governments.2 8 The Inter-American Commission itself had previously condemned
the practice and urged that it be investigated and stopped.2 9 The OAS General
Assembly characterized the crime of disappearances as "an affront to the consciousness
of the hemisphere" and a crime against humanity.30 While most human rights
instruments recognized disappearances as a crime, disappearances had not been the
object of an international judicial decision determining that they led to specific,
actionable violations.
The Veldsquez Rodriguez decision has now been codified both by regional and
international bodies, making forced disappearances an international crime. Influenced
by the Veldsquez Rodriguez decision, the Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons was passed in 1994 and entered into force in 1996.31 The
Convention incorporates the definition of disappearances used in the case, a definition
that encompasses kidnapping, torture, and murder.32 At the universal level, exposure
of this inhumane practice led to the inclusion of the crime of disappearances in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)33 and the International
Convention against Disappearances. 34 The Rome Statute defines forced disappearances
as a crime against humanity (a grave violation of human rights and fundamental
liberties) that is subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.35
These developments at the regional and international level have confirmed that forced

2
29

30

31

32

3
3

3s

See J.E. Mendez and J.M. Vivanco, "Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on
a Litigation Experience", 13 Hamline Law Review (1990), p. 507, 514-515.
See e.g. IACommHR, Report on Argentina, 11 April 1980, OEA/Ser.L/V./II/49, doc. 19, rev. para. 1;
IACommHR Report on Chile, 9 September 1985, OEA/Ser.L/V/ll.66, doc. 17.
See OAS G.A. Res. 666 (XIII-0/83) 18 November 1983; OAS G.A. Res. 742 (XIV-0/84) 17 November
1984.
Current signatories to the Convention are the following: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela.
See Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, 9 June 1994, OAS/Ser. P AG/
doc. 3114/94 rev.l (entered into force on 28 March 1996).
Article 7(2)(i) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
20 December 2006.
See Article 7(2)(i) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90.
The crime is defined as "the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time."

Ibid.
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disappearances are an international crime, further strengthening a normative
framework that condemns and punishes this type of inhumane behavior.
The impact of Veldsquez Rodriguez as the first contentious case decided by the
Court also contributed to clarifying important matters not explicitly decided by the
Convention, including the nature of the Court's proceedings, the level and kind of
proof required to prove such human rights violations, the responsibilities of the
petitioners and the nature of State responsibility or reparations.
Despite the prior proceedings at the Commission, the Court in this case established
itself as a court of first instance, practically trying the case de novo. 36 This may now
seem procedurally awkward since everything had to be proven anew, thereby
undermining the need for State cooperation in the underlying Commission
proceedings. The Honduran government in this case had not fully cooperated with
the Commission's proceedings, leading that organ to determine Honduras's
responsibility on a procedural presumption which accepted the validity of uncontested
facts alleged in the petition.37 The Commission and the lawyers of the victims decided
to retry the case before the Court, unequivocally establishing the government's
responsibility for the disappearances in open and contested judicial proceedings. This
approach contributed to exposing the crimes of disappearances to the public opinion,
while avoiding a challenge to the Court's decision (on an argument of lack of due
process) by the Honduran state.
In addition, in reviewing the case, the Court in Veldsquez Rodriguez faced two
relevant issues that would have significant importance throughout its development.
First, the Court decided that victims must first pursue all domestic remedies that
could potentially and realistically achieve the goal sought before bringing their cases
to an international tribunal.38 In defining the exhaustion of local remedies, the
Veldsquez Rodriguez Court also set forth the criteria for the interpretation of "effective
remedies," pursuant to Article 25 of the American Convention regarding the right of
access to justice.39
Second, the Court defined the standard of proof required in disappearance cases.
As the lack of forensic evidence makes it difficult to prove disappearances, the Court
held that, in some instances, disappearances could be proven only by circumstantial

36

3

38

3

See IACtHR (Judgment) 26 June 1987 (Judgments), Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Preliminary
Objections, para. 29 (stating, "[iln exercising these powers, the Court is not bound by what the
Commission may have previously decided; rather its authority to render judgment is in no way
restricted. The Court does not act as a court of review, of appeal or other similar court in its dealings
with the Commission").
See Court's Rules of Procedure, supra n. 16, Article 42.
See IACtHR (Judgment) 29 July 1988, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, para. 59; IACtHR
(Judgment) 26 June 1987 (Judgments), Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objections,
para. 88.
See IACtHR (Judgment) 24 January 1998, Blake v. Guatemala; IACtHR (Judgment) 3 November
1997, Castillo Pdez v. Peru, para. 90.
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evidence and logical inference. 40 Before it would allow circumstantial evidence,
however, the Court required the Commission to establish, by satisfying a high
standard of proof, that there was a pattern of disappearances. 41 If a pattern of
disappearances was proven, circumstantial evidence was enough to link an individual
case to such pattern. Then, the burden of proof would shift to the State to demonstrate
that it was not responsible for the disappearance. 42
Had the Court not accepted circumstantial evidence in the Veldsquez Rodriguez
case, it would have been impossible to prove State responsibility since higher
evidentiary standards (e.g. beyond a reasonable doubt) - adopted to protect individuals
rights require the State, the judges and the police to actively seek the truth, in contrast
to the Veldsquez Rodriguez case, where those entities were actually responsible for the
disappearances. In recognition of this situation, the Court's judgment reflected the
need for different evidentiary standards in international human rights tribunals as its
purpose is to determine State responsibility rather than individual guilt. 43
Furthermore, the Court in Veldsquez Rodriguez, for the first time in the InterAmerican system, ordered material and non-material damages based on international
law rather than Honduran domestic law.44 In a subsequent interpretation of its
decision on reparations, the Court protected the victims against devaluation of the
Honduran currency by ordering the payment of reparations in U.S. dollars.
While the Commission and the victim's lawyers also sought symbolic forms of
redress, the Court rejected their claim, perhaps for political concerns regarding a
possible reaction by the State of Honduras in the first case from a human rights system
still in development. 45 In numerous cases since Veldsquez Rodriguez, however, the
Court has ordered States to make reparations that have symbolic significance, such as
building monuments, publishing the Court's decision in a newspaper, or providing

40

See IACtHR (Judgment) 29 July 1988, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, paras. 124-126.

41

Ibid.

42

The Court allows circumstantial evidence in disappearances cases because "this type of repression
is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the kidnapping or the whereabouts
and fate of the victim." Ibid., para. 131.
Ibid., paras. 129-134.
See Mendez and Vivanco, supra n. 28, p. 568. In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights
regularlylooks to domestic law for issues of reparations underArticle 41 ofthe European Convention
on Human Rights. Notably, the Inter-American Court does have flexibility to refer the case to
domestic procedures for reparations due to the nature of the issue before it such as the complex
economic issues it faced in the Five Pensioners v. Peru. See IACtHR (Judgment) 28 February 2003,
Five Pensioners v. Peru, para. 178. See also S. Garcia Ramirez, La jurisdiccidn interamericanade
derechoshumanos (Mexico DF, Comisi6n de Derechos Humanos del Distrito Federal 2006), p. 188,
203.
See IACtHR (Judgment) 29 July 1988, Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,para. 194; IACtHR 21 July
1989 (Judgment) Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras,Compensatory Damages.

3
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the resources for a proper burial. 46 The Court has also required that States make
reparations to a particular community to which the victim belongs(ed) by providing
services that are otherwise lacking, so as to prevent future violations. 47
In summary, the Veldsquez Rodriguez case became an important landmark in the
developing of human rights law, exposing and delegitimizing the inhumane practice
of disappearances, while showing the value of international law when the victim could
not obtain justice in the domestic realm. Further building on its decision, the Court
has since noted that family members of the disappeared are often themselves direct
victims of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment because they have been denied
access to justice and have lived with the uncertainty of not knowing the whereabouts
of their loved ones.4 8 By framing the issue in terms of human rights abuses and not
politics, the case reinforced the position that human rights apply regardless of the
political context or the regime in power. By following a judicial process based on a
treaty, and issuing an impartial decision grounded in the rule of law, the Court
circumvented sovereignty concerns and the politics that generally accompanied
human rights discussions in the hemisphere.

3.

THE CASE OF BARRIOS ALTOS V. PERU

The case of BarriosAltos concerns amnesty laws enacted by the Peruvian government
in order to prevent the investigation of extrajudicial killings resulting from Peru's
fight against terrorism. The laws created a legal barrier to individuals who sought to
stop the crimes and prevented the protection of human rights violations.

46

47

48

See IACtHR (Judgment) 26 May 2001, The "Street Children" (Villagrdn-Morales)v. Guatemala,
paras. 6, 7 (requiring that Guatemala provide the resources for a proper burial for one of the victims,
and designate an educational center with a plaque dedicated to the victims); IACtHR (Judgment)
14 March 2001, BarriosAltos v. Peru (ordering the State to provide the beneficiaries with educational
benefits including scholarships, classroom materials, and uniforms, and to erect a monument
commemorating the victims within 60 days of the signing of an agreement between the Commission
and the State).
See IACtHR (Judgment) 20 June 2005, Fermin Ramirez v. Guatemala, para. 138(12) (ordering
Guatemala to improve detention conditions to conform with international standards); IACtHR
(Judgment) 17 June 2005, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay,para. 221 (requiring the
State to provide clean water and medical care for an indigenous community while the community
is without their own land); IACtHR (Judgment) 10 September 1993, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, para.
116(5) (ordering the opening of a school and pharmacy for the community as part of the reparations).
See also Center for Justice and International Law, "Las reparaciones en el Sistema Interamericano
de Protecci6n de los Derechos Humanos", 22 CEJIL Gaceta (2004), <http://cejil.org/sites/default/
files/Gaceta 22_sp.pdf>.
See IACtHR (Judgment) 5 July 2004, 19 Merchants v. Colombia, para. 229; IACtHR (Judgment)
7 June 2003, Juan Humberto Sdnchez v. Honduras,para. 101; IACtHR (Judgment) 22 January 1999,
Blake v. Guatemala, para. 38; IACtHR (Judgment) 25 November 2000, Bdmaca-Veldsquez v.
Guatemala, para. 160.
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On 3 November 1991, six armed members of the military entered a building in the
Barrios Altos neighborhood in Lima, Peru, while the victims were having a fundraising
party. The armed group ordered everyone to drop to the floor and opened fire,
indiscriminately killing fifteen people and injuring another four.49 The incident was
linked to the "Grupo Colina," a division within the Peruvian army that acted as a
death squad in the fight against terrorism. Information subsequently gathered from
different sources suggested that, prior to this incident, there were a series of terrorist
attacks attributed to Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) that could have triggered
the military attack. The validity of these claims, however, was never proven before the
Inter-American Court.
The first judicial investigation into the incident did not occur until 1995, four years
after the event. This investigation was suspended after the Peruvian Congress passed
the first amnesty law, which "exonerated members of the army, police forces and also
civilians who had violated human rights or taken part in such violations from 1980 to
1995 from responsibility."50
After several attacks on the constitutionality of the amnesty laws, leaving the
future of these laws uncertain, the Peruvian Congress passed law No. 26492, "directed
at interfering with legal action in the BarriosAltos case," which provided protection to
the amnesty laws, adding that it could not be reviewed by any judicial authority.
Consequently, judicial actions challenging the constitutionality of the amnesty laws
in question were abandoned and any pending investigations were closed.
The case was brought before the Inter-American system in 1995. Peru's first
response to the case was to defend the amnesty laws, claiming that they were
exceptional measures adopted based on the urgent need to fight terrorism in the
country. The Commission rejected this argument, and on 8 June 2000, the Commission
filed a petition with the Court in light of Peru's refusal to investigate the claims and
compensate the victims.
3.1.

THE DECISION

In the proceedings before the Court, the Peruvian government unsuccessfully
attempted to withdraw its recognition of the Court's contentious jurisdiction, but
eventually acknowledged its international responsibility in the case for the violations
of Articles 4 (right to life), 5 (right to personal integrity), 8 (right to due process), and
25 (access to justice) of the American Convention. The Court additionally declared
that Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention had been violated. While the Peruvian
Congress had attempted to exclude amnesty laws from judicial scrutiny, the Court
held that amnesty laws were contrary to the Convention, stating that "[t]his Court
considers that all amnesty provisions, provisions on prescription and establishment of
4

See IACtHR (Judgment) 14 March 2001, BarriosAltos v. Peru, para. 2(b).

so

Ibid., para. 2(i).
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measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because they are
intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious
human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions
and forced disappearances, all of them prohibited because they violate non-derogable
rights recognized by international human rights law."51 Furthermore, the Court
declared that "self amnesty laws lead to the defenselessness of victims and perpetuate
impunity; therefore, they are manifestly incompatible with the aims and spirit of the
Convention." 52
3.2.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE FOR THE COURT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The Inter-American Court's rejection of amnesty laws as "manifestly inconsistent"
with the Convention has had significant effects in the region, especially in the Chilean
and Argentinean contexts. The case lead Argentina's Supreme Court to declare
amnesty and pardon laws unconstitutional. Likewise, in Chile, the courts adopted the
theory of "the continuing crime" ("delito continuado") to prevent the application of
amnesty laws in violation of the Inter-American human rights norms.
In rejecting amnesty laws, the Court explicitly reinforced the duty to investigate
and punish human rights violations, as stated in Article 1(1) of the American
Convention. The Court's decision indicated that the individuals need to live in a
system that secures and guarantees protection of their internationally-protected
rights, not protection of those who violate those rights. By rejecting impunity, the
Court contributed to strengthening the rule of law, confirming that the law would not
be used as a shield to prevent the investigation of crimes.

4.

THE CASE OF AWAS TINGNI V. NICARAGUA

The Awas Tingni, an indigenous community of approximately 630 individuals, has
inhabited the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua for generations. To protect the land, the
tribe sought in vain its demarcation.
The concerns of the community regarding land titling and demarcation intensified
when the government of Nicaragua granted Maderas y Derivados de Nicaragua S.A.
(MADENSA) permission to enter the Awas Tingni's lands and make an inventory of
the tropical forest resources in preparation for large-scale logging. In December 1993,
a concession for logging on approximately 43,000 hectares of land was finalized. At
the time, the World Wildlife Fund and the University of Iowa College of Law assisted
the Awas Tingni community in negotiations with the government and MADENSA.
51
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As a result, an agreement was signed in May 1994, providing for economic benefits for
the community. Additionally, the government committed itself to start the process of
identifying, demarcating and titling the lands.
Despite these assurances, the government was actively engaged in discussions
with Sol del Caribe (SOLCARSA), another logging company from South Korea, in a
similar project that would further deplete the land's resources. When SOLCARSA
won the concession to log Awas Tingni land, the community took legal action, both
domestically and internationally.
After several attempts, the community managed to get SOLCARSA's concession
revoked in domestic courts. However, the titling and demarcation of the community
lands were still pending. Facing the lack of government cooperation in this regard, the
Commission brought the case to the Inter-American Court. The petition requested
that the Court order Nicaragua to establish and implement a procedure that would
result in the prompt demarcation and specific recognition of Awas Tingni's communal
lands, and provide monetary compensation to the Awas Tingni for the infringement
of their property rights.
4.1.

THE DECISION

The Court's proceedings illustrated the fundamental difference between the
government's and the indigenous people's views regarding the ownership of land and
resources. While the Nicaraguan government advanced the traditional paradigm of
state "dominance over territory, a perspective in which is absent a desire to understand
accurately and fully the dimensions and significance of the indigenous presence,"53
the Awas Tingni stressed communal ownership of the land based on their traditional
fishing and hunting use since time immemorial.
The Court ultimately accepted the Awas Tingni's claim, ruling that the community
was entitled to the recognition of property rights over their lands. These rights had
been expressly recognized in Nicaragua's constitution and legislation, but not
implemented. The Court also held that there were no adequate and effective remedies
for indigenous peoples to claim such rights in the domestic arena. Failure to implement
the rights expressly granted by a State's domestic legal order constituted a violation to
the American Convention.
Additionally, the Court found a violation of the right to property set forth in
Article 21 of the Convention. In its analysis of Article 21, the Court further found,
inter alia, that: 1)there is a right to communal property; and 2) indigenous peoples are
entitled to their traditional lands based on their use (e.g. fishing and hunting) since
time immemorial. For the Court, a narrower conception of rights in domestic law did
s3
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not trump broader treaty obligation. 54 According to the Court, "[tlhrough an
evolutionary interpretation of international instruments for the protection of human
rights, taking into account applicable norms of interpretation and pursuant to article
29(b) of the Convention -which precludes a restrictive interpretation of rights-, it is
the opinion of this Court that article 21 of the Convention protects the right to
property in a sense which includes, among others, the rights of members of the
indigenous communities within the framework of communal property, which is also
recognized by the Constitution of Nicaragua."55
4.2.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE FOR THE COURT AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The Court's decision in the case of the Awas Tingni community was the first
international decision to recognize the right to communal property, and to recognize
indigenous law and custom as a source of enforceable rights and obligations. The
Court stressed that "the close ties of indigenous people with the land must be
recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual
life, their integrity, and their economic survival."5 6 It concluded that "[als a result of
customary practices, possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities
lacking real title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property,
and for consequent registration."57 The Court in this case reiterated the right of
indigenous peoples to live freely within their territory, and acknowledged their legal,
cultural, and social differences, respecting and embracing them.
The case ofAwas Tingni has allowed the Court - applying the American Convention
- to continue to recognize and protect the special character of indigenous populations
and their collective rights. The importance of indigenous populations, their social
exclusion in numerous countries - including the relatively high percentages of
illiteracy and poverty in comparison to the rest of society - has led to the Commission's
creation of a Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The purpose of
that position is to promote the recognition of the rights of indigenous groups by
setting standards and initiating cases before the Inter-American organs.58
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5.

REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM

Since the Veldsquez Rodriguez decision eighteen years ago, drastic political changes
have taken place in the Americas. The Inter-American system has both contributed to
these changes and has been shaped by them. By protecting human rights and
democratic values, the system has offered a voice to victims, and at the same time has
upheld the legitimacy of human rights norms. The Inter-American Commission and
Court aided in this process by actively saving lives, authoritatively reporting violations,
and administering justice when domestic remedies failed to bring relief to the victims.
The individual petition mechanism serves as an early warning system since, when
new violations begin to emerge, they are brought to the attention of the political
organs of the OAS as well as the public.
Currently, 34 of the 35 countries in the Western Hemisphere have elected
governments. Societies in the hemisphere are more open, with greater civil society
participation than in previous decades. Nonetheless, serious problems remain: in
numerous cases, judiciaries are not perceived as fair, congresses do not perform their
"checks and balances" role when confronted with powerful executives, and poverty
and exclusion conspire against democracy and participation.
Argentine social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell discusses the phenomenon of
"delegative democracies," whereby a charismatic figure assumes the presidency after
relatively free elections and then governs without the traditional counterweights
normally associated with a representative democracy.5 9 Inherent in such "delegative
democracies" is a risk of backsliding into authoritarianism. "Charismatic leaders"
concentrate powers and adapt the constitutional legal system to perpetuate their
"leadership."
To confront this situation, it is crucial to strengthen democracy by improving
institutions of democratic governance, encouraging civil society participation, and
emphasizing the value of democratic ideas. The Inter-American system of human
rights has made valuable contributions to promoting and, in several instances,
protecting basic human rights, thereby strengthening the processes for a democratic
transformation of the region. In fact, it is widely perceived as the most successful and
participatory endeavor of an otherwise weak organization.60 The dramatic increase in
decisions adopted by the Inter-American human rights organs attests to the growing
relevance of the system. For example, the Commission received 571 petitions in 1998,
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while in 2005 it received 1,330.61 That same year, the Commission opened 150 new
cases, and had 1,137 cases and petitions pending. 62
Between the 1986 and 2005, the number of contentious cases before the Court had
risen from 3 to 74.63 In 1987, the Court issued one judgment and no pronouncements
on preliminary objections, merits or reparations. In 2005, the Court issued judgments
in 14 cases and pronouncements on preliminary objections, merits or reparations in
29 cases. 64 The number of provisional measures ordered by the Court has likewise
dramatically increased. 65 In 1980, the Court held 38 days of sessions; by 2005 that
number had almost doubled. That year, the Court held 69 days of sessions, divided
between four regular and one special session. 66 In 27.9% of the cases, States have
acknowledged their international responsibility, either completely or in part. 67 During
the 1980s, the average case before the Court lasted 39 months; since the adoption of
new Rules of Procedure in 2000, processing time for cases has been reduced to an
average of 21 months. 68
However, the system has much to achieve before developing its full potential in the
region. Some issues to be addressed concern much needed procedural improvements
and, in many instances, the required changes can be achieved by the supervisory
organs themselves. For example, by defining the Court as a "trial court" under
Veldsquez Rodriguez, every case was required to be proven twice: once before the
Commission, and then again before the Court. As a result, the expenses of the
proceedings increased, because witnesses had to be brought before both tribunals.
Moreover, the processes became less accurate as time elapsed and witnesses could not
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always clearly remember underlying events. Additionally, requiring that these cases
be tried twice greatly weakened the Commission's role by sending the message that
the member states need not cooperate with the proceedings before the Commission.
The Court has begun to address these concerns by adopting new Rules of Procedure
in November 2000, whereby the Court, while retaining its right to "retry" a case, may
give probative value to the Commission's proceedings if, in the Court's judgment,
those proceedings satisfy the necessary standards. 69 Still, the issue has yet to be fully
resolved to avoid duplication of efforts and achieve procedural economy that would,
in turn, further shorten the trial and decision periods.
A cost barrier also exists given the increasingly high litigation expenses in
Washington D.C. and Costa Rica, where the system's main supervisory organs sit.
Additionally, the Commission does not have a transparent system to grant hearings,
admit cases for processing or follow up on initiated petitions. Equally, there are
currently no deadlines for the Commission to review the admissibility or merits of
any given case. As a result, petitioners often do not know the procedural status of their
claims which, in turn, affects their opportunity to be competently and timely
represented.
The legitimacy of the system has brought about a significant increase in the number
of cases filed annually, as mentioned above. Because of these procedural inefficiencies,
there is a delay in the resolution of cases which must be promptly addressed.
Notwithstanding the importance of the Court's docket issues and internal governance
issues, the crucial obstacle impairing the system is the lack of material and political
resources accorded to it. The Commissioners and Court judges are not full-time
employees and thus each body only meets a few times per year for a few weeks each
time. To deal with a population of 800 million individuals in the hemisphere, the
Commission has only 24 full-time lawyers and the Court nine. The OAS has failed to
allocate sufficient resources to the Commission and the Court, demonstrative of a
dearth of political will.
The OAS General Assembly has been reluctant to exercise its role as political
guarantor of the system. With the adoption of the Democratic Charter in 2001, the
organization acquired additional tools to enforce human rights protections and ensure
compliance with Inter-American decisions. The member states, by adopting the
Charter, reaffirmed their will to continue to protect and strengthen human rights and
promote democratic values. This is explicitly reflected in sections IV and V of the
Charter which encompass Article 20, reading, in part: "In the event of an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the
democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may
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request the immediate convocation ofthe Permanent Council to undertake a collective
assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it deems appropriate."7 0
Although violations of human rights create a basis for action by the political organs
of the OAS, they have not yet fully exercised this possibility. Is it a lack of democratic
solidarity? Is it easier to confront dictatorships than the shortcomings of democracy?
Is it the fact that while all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere belong to the
Inter-American system, not all of them have ratified the American Convention, most
notably, Canada and the United States? Regardless of what the reason may be, without
the system being accorded the material and political support that it needs, it will not
be able to realize its full potential.

6.

CONCLUSION

The Inter-American system has demonstrated its ability to promote and strengthen
the values of human rights and democracy and has contributed significantly to their
development in the region. The cases of Veldsquez Rodriguez, BarriosAltos and Awas
Tingni illustrate the impact the system has been able to have, especially by confronting
mass and gross violations of human rights under dictatorships, by addressing their
legacy and, most recently, by seeking to strengthen fledgling democracies by promoting
inclusion and rejecting a backslide to authoritarianism.
The system is now facing new challenges of inclusion and poverty, economic, social
and cultural rights, and new challenges to democracy in the region. To aptly meet
these challenges, the system must be strengthened with the allocation of sufficient
resources demonstrative of a collective political will to act in cases of human rights
violations. To achieve those goals today, as in the past, the power of the hemispheric
common narrative of human rights as embodied in the Inter-American system is
essential.

70

Inter-American Democratic Charter, 11 September 2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.l.

Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal, Volume 2 (2009), No. 1-2
Revista Interamericana y Europea de Derechos Humanos, Afio 2 (2009), No. 1-2

65

